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Abstract 
In this paper, a group contest is analyzed, where the groups are allowed to determine their 
sharing rules either sequentially or simultaneously. It is found that in case the more numerous 
group determines its sharing rule prior to the smaller group, rent dissipation in the group 
contest is higher than in an individual contest. However, if the order of moves is endogenized, 
the smaller group will always act prior to the bigger group. Competition between the groups is 
in this way weakened and the groups are able to save on expenditures. 
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1. Introduction 
In practice, there are many examples of rent seeking contests: Different cities are in 
competition to host the Olympic Games. Thereby, they spend a lot of resources during a 
nomination process in order to increase the probability of being selected. For the 
reconstruction of the World Trade Centre, as another example, eight international groups of 
architects presented suggestions, how to design the new building. Finally, the proposal of an 
architect group from Berlin was selected. Again, all the architect groups were in competition 
for a given prize (here the fame and monetary gain from designing the new World Trade 
Centre) and spent resources while developing their proposals. Moreover, one can also think of 
an election campaign as a rent seeking contest. There are several parties, with each investing 
resources to support its candidate. 
In the literature, some contest success function, assigning to each individual or group a 
winning-probability for given resource expenditures, is used to model a rent seeking contest. 
In group competition some sharing rule is additionally needed, determining the share in the 
prize that each member of a group receives in case his group wins the contest. Nitzan (1991a, 
b) firstly introduced such a sharing rule. He thought of a rule that rewards the groups` 
members partly on an egalitarian basis, and partly according to relative outlays. This kind of 
sharing rule was adopted in most of the literature on group rent seeking contests (see, e.g., 
Lee (1995), Baik and Lee (1997), Lee and Kang (1998) or Gürtler (forthcoming)). 
Comparing the outcomes of the individual and the group contest, there is a very interesting 
and surprising result: Although the groups are allowed to “overpay” relative effort, i.e., 
although they are allowed to choose a more outlay-based incentive scheme than in the 
individual contest, the group contest will never lead to higher rent-seeking activities than the 
individual contest.1 
                                                 
1 See again Gürtler (forthcoming) for a formal proof. 
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Noticeable is, that this result is derived under the assumption of simultaneous actions of the 
players. In the individual contest, the players choose simultaneously their outlays. In the 
group contest, the groups determine simultaneously their sharing rules, and, thereafter, the 
groups` members again choose simultaneously their resource expenditures. The assumption of 
simultaneous actions in the literature on contests was justified using the following argument: 
Each contestant would have an incentive to be the first mover in a sequential contest. 
Competition for this first-mover advantage would then lead to simultaneity. However, one 
could also think that the actions in a rent seeking contest are undertaken sequentially. 
Leininger (1993) and Morgan (2003) allowed for sequential actions. In both papers, a contest 
between two individuals is considered. The individuals are able to choose between two dates 
to make their outlays. If they choose the same date, there will be a simultaneous contest. If 
they choose different dates, there will be a sequential contest. Hence, sequential play is not 
exogenously assumed, it only may occur endogenously. The results are very interesting: 
Leininger found out that, in case of asymmetric individuals, i.e., individuals with different 
valuations for the prize, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, where the individuals 
act sequentially. Assuming symmetry, the individuals are indifferent between sequential and 
simultaneous play. Consequently, either sequential or simultaneous actions may arise in 
equilibrium. The intuition behind these results is very simple. In the case of asymmetric 
players, competition will decline, if the weaker player acts in first place. Hence, it is optimal 
for the individuals to choose sequential play with the weaker player acting first in order to 
save on resource expenditures. If the players are symmetric, this cost advantage of sequential 
play disappears and, therefore, both kinds of play are equally good. While in Leininger both 
individuals are informed about their own valuation for the prize and the valuation of their 
opponent when they decide about the date at which they make their outlays, in Morgan, this 
decision is characterized by ex ante symmetry. However, his results are even stronger in favor 
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for sequential contests. There does not exist any equilibrium with simultaneous actions. It is 
always better for the individuals to act sequentially. 
In this paper, the possibility of sequential actions is extended to a group contest. Elements of 
the papers of Nitzan, Leininger and Morgan are combined in order to determine the 
importance of sequential play in group competition. To keep things as simple as possible and 
to enable a comparison of total rent seeking in group and individual contests, it is assumed 
that the groups may choose their sharing rules either simultaneously or sequentially, but that 
outlays are chosen simultaneously. This new approach reveals some interesting findings. In an 
asymmetric situation (here measured by the size of the groups), total rent seeking in the group 
contest will be higher than total rent seeking in an individual contest, if the more numerous 
group determines its sharing rule in first place. However, if the timing of the contest is chosen 
endogenously, there will exist an unique subgame perfect equilibrium with the smaller group 
determining its sharing rule prior to the bigger group. 
The paper is organized as follows: The model assumptions are introduced in section 2. As 
mentioned before, total rent seeking in the individual contest shall be compared to total rent 
seeking in the group contest. Hence, total rent seeking in the individual contest has to be 
determined. This is briefly done in section 3. Section 4 contains the solution to the group 
contest and the main results of the paper. Concluding remarks are offered in section 5. 
 
2. The model 
I consider a contest between two groups, a and b. The groups compete for a fixed and 
divisible rent or prize 0S > . Group i (i= a, b) consists of 2n i ≥  identical and risk-neutral 
members, with Nnn ba =+ . There is no further restriction on an  and bn , i.e., there may 
either be a symmetric situation with ba nn =  or an asymmetric situation with ba nn ≠ . 
Moreover, it is assumed that the individuals are not able to switch from one group to the other 
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one or to compete as an individual in the contest. Yet, they can decide not to participate in the 
contest at all. If individual k of group i chooses to take part in the contest, it invests 
observable outlay in the amount of kix  for its group. As usual in the contest literature, the 
winning-probability of group i, iΠ , is given by the ratio of its total outlays ∑
=
= i
n
1k
kii xX  
relative to the aggregate outlays of the two groups ba XXX += (see, e.g., Tullock (1980) or 
for an axiomatic approach Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998)): 
(1) XXii =Π . 
The expected utility of individual k of group i, kiV , can therefore be written as: 
(2) ( ) kikiiki xSfV −⋅⋅Π= . 
In this context, the variable kif  denotes the sharing rule used in group i. In case group i wins 
the contest, member k of this group receives the fraction kif  of the rent S. As firstly 
introduced by Nitzan (1991 a,b), this sharing rule is assumed to be given by: 
(3) ( ) ikiiiiki Xx1n1f ⋅α−+⋅α= .2 
The “payment” of a group member consists of two components. A fraction iα  of the rent is 
distributed on an egalitarian basis, while the rest is distributed according to relative outlays 
within the group. Noticeable is that there is no restriction on iα , hence, the groups are able to 
penalize relative outlay, i.e. to choose 1i >α , or to overpay it, i.e. to choose 0i <α . A group 
chooses its sharing rule such that the aggregate expected utility of its members is maximized. 
The timing of the contest game is as follows: At date zero, both groups announce, when to 
determine their sharing-rule parameters. Thereby, they are allowed to determine it either at 
date one or at date two, respectively. For simplicity, there is no discounting. If both groups 
announce the same date for determining their sharing rule, there will be a simultaneous game 
                                                 
2 This sharing rule is not as restrictive as it may seem. Under the weak condition 2n,n ba > , it can replicate 
every Nash equilibrium outcome that can be achieved with the most general sharing rule. This is shown in the 
Appendix. 
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at date one or two. Moreover, if the groups announce different dates for determining their 
sharing rules, there will be a sequential game with one group determining its sharing rule at 
date one and the other determining it at date two. A date three, the individuals decide whether 
or not to take part in the contest. Finally, at date four, the individuals taking part in the contest 
simultaneously choose their optimal outlays. It is assumed that the groups` sharing rules are 
perfectly observable. That is, at date three and four every individual knows the two sharing 
rules and in the sequential contest, the group acting at date two is able to observe the sharing 
rule of the prior acting group.3 
 
3. An individual contest as a benchmark case 
Before the solution to the group contest is provided, briefly a contest between N individuals is 
considered. If the individuals simultaneously determine their optimal rent seeking 
expenditures, and if an individual`s winning probability again is given by the ratio of its 
outlay relative to the aggregate outlay in the contest, individual i will choose its outlay in 
order to maximize the function 
(4) iN
1j
j
i
i xS
x
xV −⋅=
∑
=
. 
The first-order condition is given by: 
(5) 1S
x
xx
x
V
2
N
1j
j
i
N
1j
j
i
i =⋅




−
=∂
∂
∑
∑
=
= . 
                                                 
3 This assumption is crucial to the results to be derived in this paper. In determining the sharing rules, the two 
groups (strategically) commit to a certain behavior. Choosing its sharing-rule parameter very low, a group 
credibly demonstrates that it will act rather aggressively, i.e., that its members will choose high outlays. 
However, as Bagwell (1995) and Maggi (1999) have shown, in games, where the first mover has no private 
information, this kind of commitment will only be possible, if all actions are perfectly observable by the late-
moving players. 
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The second-order condition is satisfied. The right-hand-side of equation (5) is the same for 
every other contestant. Hence, the left-hand-side also has to be the same and, consequently, 
there exists an unique symmetric equilibrium. Aggregate rent seeking in this symmetric 
equilibrium is given by S
N
1NX ⋅−= . It is an increasing function in the number of contestants 
and the size of the rent. 
 
4. Solution to the model 
Using backwards induction, our aim is to find a subgame perfect equilibrium of the contest 
game described in section 2. First, the decisions at date four, i.e. the outlay choices for given 
sharing rules, have to be determined. Individual k of group i chooses that outlay that 
maximizes the subsequent function (6): 
(6) ( )( ) kiikiiiiiki xSXx1n1X
XV −⋅⋅α−+⋅α⋅= . 
Comparing the target functions in (4) and (6), it can immediately be seen that rent seeking in 
the individual contest will be at least as high as in the group contest, if the restriction 0i ≥α  
is imposed, i.e. if overpaying relative outlay is forbidden. For 0ba =α=α , both types of 
contest are equivalent, and, therefore, the total amount of rent seeking is the same in both. 
Clearly, if aα  or bα  increases, the incentive scheme in the group contest will become less 
outlay-based and rent seeking will decrease. Hence, only in case overpaying relative outlay is 
possible, rent seeking in the group contest might be higher than in the individual contest. 
Deriving (6) with respect to kix , yields the subsequent first-order condition: 
(7) ( ) .ijwhere,1S1
X
xX
nX
X
x
V
i2
ki
i
i
2
j
ki
ki ≠=⋅


 α−⋅−+α⋅=∂
∂  
 8
The second-order condition will be satisfied, if the condition 
( ) ( ) 0xXxX
n
X kiiki
i
i
j <−⋅α+−−α⋅−  holds, i.e., if the target function in (6) is concave. It is 
easy to see that this condition is fulfilled for all [ ]1,0i ∈α . Moreover, since jki XxX ≥− , it 
is also fulfilled for 0i <α . However, if 1i >α  the second-order condition might be violated. 
The intuition behind this result is clear: An individual initially contributing an outlay of zero 
has to consider several effects when deciding about its rent seeking activity. On the one hand, 
if it increases its outlay, its group will be more likely to win the contest. On the other hand, it 
has costs since it expends resources, and, additionally, it will be penalized by the sharing rule. 
Due to the two negative effects, an marginal increase of outlay may lower its expected utility, 
in other words, the target function may be convex and an inner-solution would describe an 
expected utility minimum. We will see later, that the groups never choose 1i >α . The 
second-order condition will therefore be satisfied in all what follows. 
Summation of equation (7) over all members of group i, yields the subsequent condition: 
(8) ( )
S
Xnn1
X
X
iiii
i ⋅−⋅α−+α= . 
Simultaneous solution of condition (8) for both groups, gives: 
(9) ( )( )aabbabaab2a nnnnnN
QSX +α−α⋅⋅+α⋅−α⋅⋅⋅= , 
(10) ( )( )bbabaabba2b nnnnnN
QSX +α−α⋅⋅+α⋅−α⋅⋅⋅= , 
(11) ( ) ( )( )11n1nQwith,
N
QSX bbaaba −α−⋅+α−⋅+α+α=⋅= . 
The decisions at date four are now analyzed. In order to find a subgame perfect equilibrium of 
the contest model, all possible outcomes at date one and two have to be determined.4 Doing 
                                                 
4 It will be seen in sections 4.1 and 4.2 that each group receives a positive expected rent. Since the members of a 
group are symmetric, they all receive a positive expected utility from participating in the contest. Hence, at date 
three, all individuals decide to take part in the contest. 
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this, both situations, the situation of simultaneous play (both groups at date zero announce the 
same date for determining their sharing rule) and the situation of sequential play (one group 
announces date one and the other date two) have to be analyzed separately. I start with the 
former one: 
 
4.1 Simultaneous play 
If both groups announce the same date for determining their sharing rule, i.e., if either both 
groups announce date one or both groups announce date two, the maximization problems of 
group a and group b will be as follows: 
(12a) ∑
=α
−⋅== a
a
n
1k
a
a
kaa XSX
X
V:VMax , 
(12b) ∑
=α
−⋅== b
b
n
1k
b
b
kbb XSX
X
V:VMax . 
The first-order conditions are given by (13a) and (13b), respectively: 
(13a)
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ,0
N
nnnQnnnnnn1
nnn
V bababaababbaa
bab
a
a =⋅−⋅++α⋅−α⋅+α−α⋅⋅⋅−−⋅−=α∂
∂
(13b) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .0
N
nnnQnnnnnn1
nnn
V baabbaabbabab
baa
b
b =⋅−⋅++α⋅+α⋅−α−α⋅⋅⋅−−⋅−=α∂
∂
Solving these first-order conditions for the equilibrium sharing-rule parameters, we get: 
(14) ( )1nN
nn
a
ba
si,a −⋅
−=α ; ( )1nN
nn
b
ab
si,b −⋅
−=α .5 
In the case of simultaneous actions and groups of unequal size, the more numerous group 
always installs a less outlay-based incentive scheme than the less numerous group. A group 
consisting of fewer members than the other, has a size-advantage since it suffers less from 
free-riding. However, it also has a size-disadvantage since less members contribute rent-
                                                 
5 The index si stands for simultaneous play. 
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seeking activities. In the optimum, the smaller group strengthens its advantage due to free-
riding by installing a more outlay-based incentive scheme than the more numerous group. 
Moreover, the smaller group chooses a negative sharing-rule parameter, while the more 
numerous group chooses a positive one. At first sight, it might therefore be possible that rent 
is more dissipated in the group contest than in the individual contest. However, from the 
literature on rent seeking contests we know that this is not true. Inserting si,aα  and si,bα  into 
equation (11), we see that aggregate rent seeking equals ( )
N
S1N ⋅− , hence, total rent seeking 
in the group contest and the individual contest is the same, although the incentive structure is 
quite different. If the two groups are of equal size, the solution will be 0si,bsi,a =α=α . As 
mentioned before, the group contest is then equivalent to the individual contest and rent 
seeking again is ( )
N
S1N ⋅− . Proposition 1 summarizes these results: 
 
Proposition 1: If the groups simultaneously determine their sharing rules, total rent seeking 
in the group contest equals total rent seeking in the individual contest. 
 
Lastly, the groups` aggregate utilities have to be calculated. Using the optimal sharing-rule 
parameters in (14), we get: 
(15) 2ba N
SnV ⋅= ; 2ab N
SnV ⋅= . 
The aggregate utility of the smaller group always exceeds the aggregate utility of the more 
numerous group. It increases in the size of the rent, while it decreases in the size of the more 
numerous group as well as in its own size. The aggregate utility of the more numerous group 
increases in the size of the rent and the size of the opponent group, and decreases in the own 
size. The group size effects on the groups` utilities are mainly due to changes in the incentive 
schemes. If the size of the smaller group increases, the bigger group will choose a more 
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outlay-based incentive scheme, while the smaller group decides to install a more egalitarian 
remuneration of its members. As a result, the more numerous group is better off, while the 
smaller group suffers from the new situation. Similarly, if the size of the bigger group 
increases, the smaller group will increase the incentives of its members, while there will be no 
clear effect on the sharing rule of the bigger group. However, in this case, both groups suffer 
from the new situation, since the aggregate utilities of both groups get lower. 
 
4.2 Sequential play 
If one group announces to determine its sharing rule at date one, while the other announces to 
determine it at date two, there will be a sequential game, starting at date one with one group 
deciding before the other. This (sub)game again has to be solved by backwards induction. For 
expositional purposes, the group acting first is denoted as group 1 and the group acting in 
second place is denoted as group 2. It is assumed that group 2 is able to observe the chosen 
sharing rule of the other group 1. Hence, it has to solve the subsequent maximization problem: 
(16) ∑
=α
−⋅== 2
2
n
1k
2
2
2k2 XSX
XV:VMax . 
The first-order condition is given by: 
(17)
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .0
N
nnnQnnnnnn1
nnn
V 2111211221212
211
2
2 =⋅−⋅++α⋅+α⋅−α−α⋅⋅⋅−−⋅−=α∂
∂  
From this first-order condition, the reaction function of group 2 can be determined as follows: 
(18) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )1nn2
nn
1nn2
1nnn
21
12
21
112
12 −⋅⋅
−+−⋅⋅
−⋅−⋅α=α . 
Group 1 has to consider this reaction function, when it decides about its sharing rule. Hence, 
its maximization problem is given by: 
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(19) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .1nn2
nn
1nn2
1nnn
.t.s
XS
X
XV:VMax
21
12
21
112
12
n
1k
1
1
1k1
1
1
−⋅⋅
−+−⋅⋅
−⋅−⋅α=α
−⋅== ∑
=α  
The solution to this maximization problem is: 
(20) 01 =α . 
We therefore get: 
(21) ( )1nn2
nn
21
12
2 −⋅⋅
−=α . 
From (21), it is obvious that 02 <α  holds if and only if 21 nn > . As in the case of 
simultaneous actions, the less numerous group chooses a smaller sharing-rule parameter, and, 
therefore, a more outlay-based incentive scheme than its opponent. Implications about total 
rent seeking are given in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: In case both groups determine their optimal sharing rules sequentially, the 
degree of rent seeking depends on which team moves first: 
(i) If the less numerous team firstly determines its sharing rule, less resources will be 
dissipated in the group contest than in the individual contest. 
(ii) If the more numerous group firstly determines its sharing rule, the group contest 
will lead to higher rent seeking activities than the individual contest. 
(iii) If both groups are of the same size, total rent dissipation will be the same in both 
kinds of contest. 
 
Similarly to the results in Leininger, the order of moves affects the intensity of competition 
between the two groups. If the more numerous group acts in first place, it will determine its 
sharing-rule parameter extremely low in order to show its opponent that it is willing to win 
the contest no matter what it costs. The smaller group would then choose its best response 
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according to condition (18) and, therefore, it would “accept the challenge”. There would be 
some kind of rat race, in the sense of Akerlof (1976), since competition between the two 
groups would escalate significantly. As a result, both groups would choose extremely outlay-
based incentive schemes and total rent seeking would be very high. As described in 
proposition 2, it would even exceed total rent seeking in the individual contest. The result that 
rent seeking in the group contest is never higher than in the individual contest therefore only 
holds for simultaneous determinations of the sharing rules, for sequential choices it is not true. 
However, in case the smaller group firstly determines its sharing rule, competition is 
extremely weakened. The smaller group realizes that if it would choose a very little sharing-
rule parameter, its opponent would react by also choosing an extremely outlay-based 
incentive scheme. Hence, it chooses a rather moderate sharing rule in order to commit to a 
less intensified competition. As a result, there will be a kind of implicit collusion between the 
two groups.6 
Again, the groups` aggregate utilities need to be determined. Using the optimal sharing rules, 
they can be written as: 
(22) 
1
1 n4
SV ⋅= ; 12 n4
SV ⋅= . 
Both groups, the group acting at date one and the group acting at date two, receive the same 
aggregate utility. This utility depends on which group determines its sharing rule first. As can 
be seen from (22) and as is intuitively clear, the groups` aggregate utilities are higher if the 
smaller group determines its sharing rule prior to the more numerous group. In this case, 
competition is weakened and the groups can save on expenditures. 
 
4.3 The optimal decision at date zero 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Dye (1984) on collusion in contests. 
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The reduced game at date zero is a simultaneous two player game. Each player, i.e. each 
group has two possible actions: It can announce either to determine its sharing rule at date one 
or at date two. Hence, the game at date zero can be presented appropriately by using the 
matrix in figure 1: 
 
 
2b N
Sn ⋅             , 
                         2a N
Sn ⋅  
an4
S
⋅             , 
                     
an4
S
⋅  
bn4
S
⋅                , 
                        
bn4
S
⋅  
2b N
Sn ⋅             , 
                        2a N
Sn ⋅  
 
 
From figure 1, it can be seen that the reduced game at date zero will have an unique 
equilibrium, if the two groups are of unequal size. In this case, the smaller group announces to 
determine its sharing rule at date one, while the more numerous group announces date two for 
determining its sharing rule. If both groups are of equal size, all payoffs in the matrix will be 
identical. Consequently, each group is always indifferent between acting at date one or at date 
two (and any probability distribution over these two actions). Hence, in any subgame perfect 
equilibrium, there can either be simultaneous or sequential play. Proposition 3 considers the 
degree of rent seeking in the group contest: 
 
Proposition 3: 
(i) If both groups are of different size, there will be a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium to the group contest with the smaller group determining its sharing 
Date one 
Date one Date two 
Date two 
Group a 
Group b 
Figure 1. Reduced Game at date zero 
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rule prior to the more numerous one. Rent seeking activities will be lower than in 
the individual contest. 
(ii) If both groups are of equal size, both groups are always indifferent between acting 
at date one or date two. In equilibrium, there can either be sequential or 
simultaneous play. Rent dissipation will always be the same as in the individual 
contest. 
 
The results derived in this section are similar to the results that Leininger derived for the 
contest between individuals. In the case of asymmetric groups, there exists a unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium, in which the smaller (or weaker) group acts prior to the more numerous 
(or stronger) group. Using this order of moves, the two groups are able to weaken competition 
and, therefore, to save on resource expenditures. As a consequence, in the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium of the asymmetric group contest, rent seeking is lower than in the 
individual contest. In the case of equal numerous groups, the two groups do not care any more 
about the order of moves. In this case, rent-seeking activities in the group contest and in the 
individual contest are the same. 
 
4.4 Preemptive behavior 
In section 4.2, the possibility of preemptive behavior was not considered. However, the group 
determining its sharing rule prior to the other might be interested in choosing such an 
aggressive sharing rule that the other group drops out of the contest, i.e. that the other group 
determines its sharing rule such that its members contribute zero outlays. This corner solution 
is analyzed in this section. Using the reaction function (18) together with one of the 
conditions (9) or (10), one can see that the group acting at date two will drop out of the 
contest, if the condition 
1Nnn
n1
21
2
1 +−⋅
−≤α  holds. Notice that the right-hand-side of this 
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condition is negative. Group 1 therefore has to choose an extremely aggressive, i.e. an 
extremely outlay-based incentive scheme to achieve a resignation of group 2. If preemptive 
behavior is optimal, group 1 will choose 
1Nnn
n1
21
2
1 +−⋅
−=α  and we will get 02 =α , 0X2 =  
and SX1 = . Group 1 has to spend extremely high resources in order to keep group 2 off the 
contest. The total rent S would be dissipated and the aggregate utility of group 1 would equal 
zero. Clearly, this behavior cannot be optimal. Hence, we get the following corollary: 
 
Corollary 1: In the group rent seeking contest, there will never be preemptive behavior by the 
first acting group. 
 
Group 1 never chooses such an aggressive incentive scheme that group 2 decides not to enter 
the contest. It prefers a sensible degree of competition and “allows” group 2 to enter the 
contest. As a consequence, the results derived in section 4.1 to 4.3 remain unchanged. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, a group contest was considered. Extending the literature on these contests, the 
groups were allowed to determine their sharing rules either simultaneously or sequentially. 
Several interesting results were derived. If the more numerous group chooses its sharing rule 
prior to the smaller group, the group contest will lead to higher rent seeking activities than an 
individual contest. As known from the literature on contests, this would never happen, if play 
had been restricted to occur simultaneously. However, if the timing of the contest is 
endogenized, the smaller group will always act first. In this case, the group contest leads to 
less rent dissipation than the individual contest. Further, it was seen that preemptive behavior 
is never optimal. In order to prevent its opponent from entering the contest, the first acting 
group had to spend resources equal to the rent the two groups compete for. Hence, the first 
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moving group prefers a more moderate strategy. It accepts that the other group enters the 
contest. The disadvantage of eventually not receiving the prize is outbalanced by economizing 
on resource expenditures. 
 
Appendix 
In this Appendix, it is shown that the sharing rule described in (3) is able to replicate every 
Nash-equilibrium outcome that can be achieved with the most general sharing rule when 
2n,n ba > . 
Think that group i uses some (general) sharing rule, that is, ( )ini2i1kiki ix,...,x,xff = , where 
1f
in
1k
ki =∑
=
. The share in the rent that member k of group i receives, (somehow) depends on the 
outlays of all the group’s members. 
Individual k of group i chooses that outlay that maximizes: 
(23) kikiiki xSfX
XV −⋅⋅= . 
Deriving (23) with respect to kix , yields the subsequent first-order condition: 
(24) 1S
x
f
X
X
f
X
X
x
V
ki
kii
ki2
j
ki
ki =⋅



∂
∂⋅+⋅=∂
∂ . 
Summation of equation (24) over all members of group i, yields the subsequent condition: 
(25) ( )( )2ijij
2
i
n
1k ki
ki
i
n
1k ki
kii
2
j
XXXXS
Xn
x
f
nS
x
f
X
X
X
X ii
+⋅+⋅
⋅=∂
∂⇔=⋅



∂
∂⋅+ ∑∑
==
. 
Condition (25) characterizes the Nash-equilibrium of the subgame beginning at date four. 
Since the rent has to be completely distributed within the winning group, a group can 
influence the total outlay of its members (and of the other group’s members) only by adjusting 
∑
= ∂
∂in
1k ki
ki
x
f . 
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We now have to show, that the sharing rule in (3) is able to replicate every general Nash-
equilibrium outcome. In particular, we have to show that for this sharing rule, ∑
= ∂
∂in
1k ki
ki
x
f  may 
adopt every possible value by appropriately setting iα . 
Given the sharing rule in (3), it is straightforward to show that ( )
i
i
i
n
1k ki
ki
X
1n1
x
fi −⋅α−=∂
∂∑
=
.  
From (9) and (18), we know that 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )iijjijiijjjiiji2i nnnnn11n1nNSX +α−α⋅⋅+α⋅−α⋅⋅−α−⋅+α−⋅+α+α⋅=  and 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ij ijiij iijj n1n2
nn
n1n2
1nnn
⋅−⋅
−+α⋅⋅−⋅
−⋅−=α . With these expressions we get 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )11n11nn2S
11nn4
x
f
iiiii
iii
n
1k
i
ki
ki
i
−−⋅α⋅+−⋅α+⋅−⋅
α−⋅−⋅⋅=α∂
∂∑
=
. 
This function has exactly one null at 1i =α . Further, we can show that 
( ) 2nfor,0
x
f
i
1
1
n
1k
i
ki
ki
1
i >>α∂α∂
∂∂
=α=
∑ . On that account, for 2n i >  there is no maximum or 
minimum at 1i =α .  Moreover, there are two points, where the function is not defined, 
namely 
1n
1n2ˆ
i
i
i −
−⋅=α  and 
1n
1~
i
i −=α . Note that 11 ˆ
~ α<α . Between 1~α  and 1αˆ , the function 
( )∑
=
α∂
∂in
1k
i
ki
ki
x
f  is continuous. Since ( ) ∞→ε+α∂
∂∑
=→ε
i
n
1k ki
ki
0
ˆ
x
f
lim
i
 and ( ) ∞→ε+α∂
∂∑
=→ε
i
n
1k ki
ki
0
~
x
f
lim
i
, 
the sharing rule could replicate every general equilibrium outcome if 1~ i <α  and 1ˆ i >α . One 
easily see that 1ˆ i >α  always holds. Further, one can see that 2n1~ ii >⇔<α . Hence, if 
group i consists of more than two members, it will be able to determine the parameter iα  to 
achieve the same outcome as if it would use some general sharing rule. The same 
argumentation could be done for group j. Consequently, when 2n,n ba > , the sharing rule in 
(3) is able to replicate every Nash-equilibrium outcome. 
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